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Introduction
Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, becoming
the newest independent state in Europe.' Media outlets worldwide widely
covered the lead up to its independence and included coverage of crimes
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and the intervention of NATO in 1999
to stop the atrocities. While many Kosovars originally sought asylum in
the United States on the basis of persecution at the hands of the Milosevic
government, in the years that followed, many Kosovars sought asylum on a
new basis. These new asylum claims were complex, and included two
independent (although related) forms of past persecution. The first was
the original, well-known case of persecution on account of the crimes com-
mitted by the Serbian government. The second claim, significantly less
covered by media outlets and largely unknown to those outside of Kosovo,
involved post-NATO intervention persecution at the hands of Albanian
extremists (former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters). The KLA per-
secution included political intimidation, interrogations, beatings, and kill-
ings of pacifist Kosovar Albanians who did not participate in the Kosovo
war. 2 Despite the numerous asylum applications that tell stories of horren-
dous treatment,3 many Kosovar asylum-seekers have had difficulty
obtaining asylum in the United States.
Many claims of these Kosovar asylum applicants fail to establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution. Although claims of past persecution
are often found credible, Department of Homeland Security attorneys have
often succeeded in rebutting the presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution through evidence of "changed country conditions. ' '4
The evidence most often used to show "changed country conditions" are
U.S. Department of State Reports on Human Rights Practices for the partic-
1. See Dan Bilefsky, In a Showdown, Kosovo Declares Its Independence, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.18, 2008, at Al.
2. For an in-depth discussion of the dual past persecution claims of Kosovar asy-
lum-seekers, see infra Part I.
3. Most asylum applications do not make their way to the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the United States. Unfortunately, only the circuit court decisions and a small number
of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) opinions are available to the public, the other
decisions are restricted. For more on the complete process of applying for asylum in the
United States, see infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part II for a discussion regarding what asylum applicants must show in
order to succeed in getting asylum.
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ular country. 5 This evidence is often applied generally and mechanically, 6
without an individualized assessment of how the purported changed coun-
try conditions affect the asylum eligibility of the applicant. 7 With Kosovo's
declaration of independence, Kosovar asylum applicants run the risk of
having their claims for asylum denied on a general assessment of Kosovo's
"changed" status.
Part I of this Note provides general background on the Kosovo situa-
tion, including accounts of the Milosevic Serb government's crimes prior to
and during the Kosovo war, the NATO intervention and Kosovo's supervi-
sion under the United Nations' Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and an account of continued conditions in Kosovo since
Kosovo's independence on February 17, 2008. Part II provides background
on asylum law, particularly what the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) requires of asylum applicants to qualify for refugee status and attain
asylum in the United States. Part II also provides an explanation of the
jurisprudence of "changed country conditions." Part III introduces the asy-
lum claims of typical Kosovar asylum-seekers by examining the facts as
they appear in several typical circuit court decisions. These facts include
the applicants' claims of persecution by the Serb military, as well as perse-
cution by ethnic Albanian extremist members of the KLA. Part IV provides
examples of the holdings of these asylum tribunals, and focuses on how
the Immigration Judges, Board of Immigration Appeals and the Circuit
Courts applied the purported "changed country conditions" to particular
cases, as well as why these decisions were wrong.
In Part V, I argue that a mechanical application of U.S. State Depart-
ment reports in determining "changed country conditions" is the wrong
approach when assessing the complex claims of Kosovar asylum-seekers.
While U.S. State Department reports are often used as the only available
evidence of country conditions, in the case of Kosovo these reports are not
fully accurate and misstate the actual conditions in Kosovo. This part also
compares the Kosovar claims to those of Albanian asylum-seekers that
feared the communists. In Part VI, I argue that adjudicators should use a
new framework for analyzing asylum claims of Kosovar asylum-seekers,
and I advocate for a framework that pits the evidence of past persecution at
the hands of Albanian extremists against the U.S. Department of State
5. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04[5][g]
(2008).
6. See Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U.
COLO. L. REv. 3, 17 (2000) ("Many recent decisions defer mechanically to State Depart-
ment conclusions citing the results of single elections or changes in law "on the books"
as proof that refugees have nothing to fear."). See also Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d
179, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that in the case of Albania, which is no longer run by
the Communists, "an immigration judge need not enter specific findings premised on
record evidence when making a finding of changed country conditions .... ).
7. See Alibasic v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (vacating the decision of
the BIA denying a Kosovar's claims for asylum because it "failed to conduct an individu-
alized analysis of whether the changes in conditions in [Alibasic's homeland] were so
fundamental that they are sufficient to rebut the presumption that [Alibasic's] fear of
persecution is well-founded") (quotations and citations omitted).
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reports in determining whether Kosovo's conditions have changed mean-
ingfully for the particular asylum applicant. Finally, in Part VII, I consider
some of the perceived weaknesses of the new framework, and explain why
it remains a preferable alternative to the current model.
I. General Background on the Kosovo Situation
A. The Kosovo Conflict
As Yugoslavia dissolved, Kosovo, like Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia,
and Bosnia, desired to become an independent state.8 However, unlike the
other countries that seceded from the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, through
the leadership of its leading political party, the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK), attempted to achieve the same result through non-violent
means.9 This LDK-backed, non-violent approach failed to secure indepen-
dence for Kosovo and the subsequent suppression of the Albanian majority
of Kosovo brought violence and ignited support for the radical paramilitary
force known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 10 In 1997, the KLA
initiated its violent campaign with small attacks on Serbian police officers
and Albanians deemed to be Serb-collaborators.
1 1
Despite the KLA's attacks, the leader of the LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, dis-
missed stories of the KLA's uprising and claimed that the Serbian secret
police had invented them. 1 2 As a response to the KLA's provocations, "[o]n
February 28, [1998,] Serbian special police forces launched their first
large-scale, military attack on villages . ..suspected of harboring KLA
members."'13 Beginning after February 28, 1998, KLA and Serbian forces
engaged in ongoing hostilities that continued until after the NATO inter-
vention. 14 As a result of these hostilities, the Office of the United Nations
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that, by August 3, approx-
imately 200,000 Kosovars had been displaced. 15 After several interna-
tional diplomatic attempts to end the Kosovo conflict failed, NATO
8. Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo, The Changing Contours of World
Politics, and the Challenge of World Order, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION 1, 3-4 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000).
9. Id. at 4. See also Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective From Inside, in
Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 32, 33 (Albrecht Schnabel
& Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000) ("Led by Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the Demo-
cratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Kosovars conducted a non-violent campaign to win
their right to self-determination."); TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE 84 (Yale Uni-
versity Press 2000) (stating that Rugova's LDK pacified Kosovo while making the case
for independence to the international community).
10. See Schnabel & Thakur, supra note 8, at 4. For a detailed account of the rise of
the KLA in Kosovo, see JUDAH, supra note 9, at 94-103.
11. Tim JUDAH, Kosovo: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 79 (Oxford Univ. Press
2008).
12. Id.
13. THE Kosovo CRISIS: FACTS, FIGURES AND DOCUMENTS 49 (W. Van Der Wolf ed.,
1999).
14. Id.
15. JUDAH, supra note 11, at 82.
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intervened with a bombing campaign that began on March 24, 1999.16
The bombing of Serbian military and dual-use targets lasted for 78
days. 17 During the bombings, the number of displaced Kosovars seeking
refuge outside of Kosovo continued to increase until June 4, 1999.18 On
June 4, the toll had reached "a reported total of 670,000 in the neighboring
countries (Albania, Macedonia), along with an estimated 70,000 in Monte-
negro (within FRY), and 75,000 who had left for other countries." 19 These
figures do not include the number of displaced Kosovars within Kosovo,
estimated by NATO to have been around 200,000-300,000 in the year
before the bombings. 20 By November 10, 1999, over 2,100 bodies had
been found in approximately one-third of the 529 grave sites that had been
reported to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), with more than 11,000 deaths reported to the ICTY prosecutors.2 1
The international community had, by this time, begun to recognize this
violence as a systematic campaign implemented by the Serbian government
of Milosevic to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.
22
On May 22, 1999, the ICTY charged Slobodan Milosevic with crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.23 The
indictment against Milosevic accused him of planning, preparing and
ordering the forceful expulsion of "over 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, approx-
imately one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population" and the killing
of "[an unknown number of Kosovo Albanians. '' 24 Although the atrocities
committed by the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic are well-known,
the KLA also committed a number of crimes, often killing civilians
indiscriminately. 25
16. Id. at 83-87.
17. Id. at 87.
18. THE Kosovo CRISIS, supra note 13, at 75.
19. Id.
20. id.
21. UN Gives Figure for Kosovo Dead, BBC NEwS, Nov. 10, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/514828.stm. For number of deaths of particular massacres carried out
by the Serbian forces on civilian Kosovar Albanians, see JUDAH, supra note 11, at 89-90.
22. U.S. Dep't of State, Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting 3-4 (1999),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/kosovoii/pdf/kosovii.pdf
(listing as aspects of ethnic cleansing: forcible displacement of Kosovar Albanians, loot-
ing of homes and businesses, widespread burning of homes, use of human shields,
detentions, summary executions, exhumation of mass graves, rape, violations of medical
neutrality, and identity cleansing).
23. THE Kosovo CRISIS, supra note 13, at 350.
24. Id. at 356.
25. See, e.g., JUDAH, supra note 11, at 84 ("The number of clashes began multiplying,
as did ugly incidents of pure terror, such as the gunning down of six Serbian teenagers
in the Panda Cafe . . . .");JUDAH, supra note 9, at 137 ("Kosovar observers calculate that
since 1996 [until March 1998] the organisation has claimed responsibility for killing
twenty-one citizens in the province, including five policemen, five Serb civilians and
eleven Kosovars accused of collaborating with the Serbian regime.") (citations omitted).
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B. The Aftermath of the Kosovo Conflict
At the end of the Kosovo conflict, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999, transferring
the jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, and creating the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 2 6 The goal of the
UNMIK was to help Kosovo by "provid[ing] transitional administration
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional demo-
cratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo." 2 7 UNMIK experienced some
successes during its supervision of Kosovo, including creating and training
the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), issuing Kosovars documents such as
UNMIK passports, overseeing the creation of an assembly, and overseeing
national elections. 2 8
On October 10, 1999, the leader of KLA, Hashim Thaci, created the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK).2 9 On its website, the PDK honors its
roots by stating on its history page that "The Democratic Party of Kosovo
was founded at a very important moment of our history. After the heroic
war of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the entry of international
forces . . . the conditions were appropriate for political activity."30
Although the LDK remained in power through the general elections of
November 17, 2001,31 and the general elections of October 23, 2004,32 it
lost the general elections of November 17, 2007 to Hashim Thaci's PDK. 33
After the 2007 election defeat, the LDK joined a fragile coalition with
the PDK, retaining some ministry positions and the Presidency. The PDK
became the dominant party in Kosovo, with Hashim Thaci as the Prime
Minister.34 Despite their "coalition of convenience" the two parties have
continued to spar, recently threatening to break off their coalition and force
26. S.C. Res. 1244, 11 9-11, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
27. Id. at 10.
28. Judah, supra note 11, at 95.
29. See Democratic Party of Kosovo History Page, http://www.pdk-ks.org/advCms/?
id=4,124,124,124,a (stating that the PDK was founded on October 10, 1999, and that
Hashim Thaci has been its leader since its founding) (translated from Albanian).
30. Id. ("Partia Demokratike e KosovEs u themelua ne nje moment tE ve~ante te his-
torise sone. Pas luftes heroike td Ushtrise Ctlirimtare te Kosoves dhe vendosjes si forcave
nderkombetare, . . . u krijuan kushtet e pershtatshme p&r veprimtari politike.") (trans-
lated from Albanian).
31. The LDK gained 47 seats in the assembly while the PDK gained 26. Adam
Carr's Election Archive, Legislative Election of 17 November 2001, http://psephos.
adam-carr.net/countries/k/kosovo/kosovo2001.txt.
32. The LDK gained 49 seats compared to the 31 seats for the PDK. Adam Carr's
Election Archive, Legislative Election of 23 October 2004, http://psephos.adam-carr.
net/countries/k/kosovo/kosovo2004.txt.
33. In the 2007 elections, the latest as of this writing, the PDK gained 37 seats in the
assembly while the LDK gained 25 seats. Adam Carr's Election Archive, Legislative Elec-
tion of 17 November 2007, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/k/kosovo/kosovo
2007.txt. Hashim Thaci is currently the Prime Minister of Kosovo.
34. See Krenar Gashi, Two Kosovo Parties to Form Government, BALKAN INSIGHT, Dec.
25, 2007, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/7145 ("Thaci will lead a gov-
ernment of 7 ministers from his party, 5 ministers from LDK and 3 ministers from
representatives of non-Albanian communities, according to Balkan Insight sources.").
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early elections in Kosovo. 35
Under Hashim Thaci's leadership, Kosovo declared independence on
February 17, 2008.36 As of March 23, 2010, sixty-five countries have rec-
ognized Kosovo's independence, including the majority of the European
Union countries and the United States. 3 7 Although the declaration of inde-
pendence will likely afford the current Albanian government of Kosovo an
increased ability to govern without obstacles from international bodies, the
Kosovo situation has not yet been resolved and Kosovo's declaration of
independence may only be the latest, rather than the final development, of
this saga.38
C. Post Kosovo Conflict Stories of Political Pressure
The Kosovo Liberation Army and other radical Albanian groups com-
mitted many atrocities after the end of the Kosovo conflict. Examples of
these atrocities include burnings and lootings of Serb and Roma property,
beatings, and killings. 39 The KLA also maintained a network of secret pris-
ons "where Kosovo Serbs, Albanians and Roma were interrogated, tortured
and in most cases killed."40 According to Tim Judah, "even after the
demilitarisation of the KLA, killings continued, sometimes committed by
the 'secret police' which was connected to Thaci's ministry of the inte-
rior."4 1 Included in these atrocities were those directed at moderate
Kosovar Albanians and critics of the KLA, often named "Serb
collaborators.
4 2
The KLA directed many of their attacks at LDK party members. The
LDK and Ibrahim Rugova, unlike the KLA, had sought a non-violent solu-
tion to Kosovo's independence. 4 3 After the Kosovo conflict, politically
motivated crime increased as ethnically motivated crimes decreased. 44
According to a March 3, 2000 report by the International Crisis Group,
35. See Petrit Collaku, Fraud Forces Kosovo Election Re-runs, BALKAN INSIGHT, Dec. 21,
2009, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/24547 ("Officials from LDK and
PDK said over the weekend that the governing coalition is in political crisis and they
believe that early elections will be held in spring 2010 .... [T]he latest developments
and the second round of elections are a clear signal that PDK and LDK cannot govern
together.").
36. Bilefsky, supra note 1, at Al.
37. See Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State? Home Page, http://www.
kosovothanksyou.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
38. For more on why the status of Kosovo is still not completely determined despite
the declaration of independence, see JUDAH, supra note 11, at 140-5 1. See also Kosovo
and Serbia Set for UN ICJ Battle, THE Kosovo TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.kosovo
times.net/analysis/1004-kosovo-and-serbia-set-for-un-icj-battle.pdf.
39. See JUDAH, supra note 9, at 290 ("The most serious incidents of violence, how-
ever, have been carried out by members of the KLA.").
40. See Michael Montgomery, Horrors of KLA Prison Camps Revealed, BBC NEWs,
Apr. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7990984.stm.
41. See JuDAH, supra note 9, at 290.
42. See id. at 137, 292-95. See also JuDAH, supra note 11, at 96-98.
43. See Demjaha, supra note 9, at 33.
44. See International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 88, What Happened to the
KLA? 16 (2000), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg180/icg180.pdf.
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"[i]n almost all cases the victims have been prominent officials of the LDK,
and here the argument of cui bono (who benefits?) appears irresistible,
since the LDK is the PPDK's only credible political opponent (even more
so, as in the countryside where the war was fought, many people see the
KLA and the LDK as complementary organisations)." 45 An example pro-
vided in the report notes that "[ojn 23 February 2000, another local LDK
activist and schoolteacher, Ismet Veliqi, was abducted, beaten, shot and left
for dead. Veliqi claims that the assailants were Albanians, who during the
mistreatments asked him: 'Why do you still support Rugova?"' 46 Tim
Judah reports that "[diuring the autumn of 1999, as Rugova's war-shattered
LDK began reorganising, party officials were threatened, harassed and at
least one was killed."'47 Although there have been numerous crimes com-
mitted against the political opponents of the KLA, the events have rarely
been reported due to journalists' fear of repercussions. 48
Also very worrisome are reports that a new extremist Albanian group,
the Albanian National Army (ANA) (also known as the Armata Kombetare
Shqiptare (AKSH)), has been formed and continues to grow in number.49
The ANA's alleged goal is "uniting all ethnic Albanian lands in the
Balkans." °5 0 The ANA has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in
the region, and has been declared a terrorist organization by the UNMIK.5 1
This group has been closely associated with the KLA.5 2
45. Id. Note that the PPDK is the former name of the PDK party. The party changed
its name from PPDK (Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo) to PDK (Democratic
Party of Kosovo) on May 21, 2000 because of an internal dispute over whether the word
"progress" had Albanian origins. See BPT International, Monthly Reports No. 15, May
2000, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/reports/2000/bpt-k-monthlyl9O6.html.
46. International Crisis Group, supra note 44 at 16 n.18.
47. JUDAH, supra note 9, at 294-95 (linking the KLA to the crimes committed against
the moderate Kosovar Albanians and LDK party members).
48. See JUDAH, supra note 11, at 98 ("In Kosovo, journalists can get killed for probing
into these things so, in general, they don't."). See also U.S. Dep't of State, 2008 Human
Rights Report: Kosovo §2(a) (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/eur/1 19462.htm ("[Tihere were reports of intimidation of reporters, including by
officials in the public sector and government and by politicians and businesses....
Journalists reported pressure from politicians and organized crime, which frequently
resulted in indirect forms of censorship. Some journalists refrained from critical investi-
gative reporting out of fear for their personal security."); Veton Surroi Refuses to Partici-
pate in the State Events, Raises Voice Against Pressure on Media, THE Kosovo TIMES, June
15, 2009, http://www.kosovotimes.net/kosovo-chronicle/511-veton-surroi-refuses-to-
participate-in-the-state-events-raises-his-voice-against-pressure-on-free-m.html (reporting
that Veton Surroi refused to participate in events marking first anniversary of Kosovo's
Constitution because of refusal by leaders to protect "a long list of media people who are
being exposed to direct pressure . . . on many cases directly by representatives of the
governing structures in the Republic of Kosovo").
49. Report: ANA Paramilitaries Patrolling Northern Kosovo Towns, SOUTHEAST EUROPE
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/enGB/features/
setimes/features/2007/11/14/feature-01 (reporting that since its creation in 2001, the
ANA has reportedly grown to 12,000).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Altin Raxhimi, The KLA: From Guerrilla Wars to Party Plenums, BALKAN
INSIGHT, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/18016/ ("Several former senior
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Kosovar seekers' pleas for asylum often fall on deaf ears because, since
the end of the Kosovo conflict, foreign powers who want the Kosovo project
to succeed have largely ignored the continuing atrocities in Kosovo. As Tim
Judah stated:
Unfortunately, especially in a book such as this, readers should be aware
that there are also many things that are either known or widely believed but
which cannot be written about for legal reasons. The sort of thing being
referred to includes questions of when outsiders turn a blind eye to things
they should not, in return for stability.5 3
II. Asylum Law and the Jurisprudence of Changed Country
Conditions
A. The Asylum Process
The asylum process in the United States can begin in one of two ways:
either asylum-seekers may affirmatively apply for asylum by filing asylum
applications, or undocumented immigrants that are apprehended can
request asylum as a defense in deportation proceedings. 5 4 The affirmative
asylum process involves: (1) arriving in the United States; (2) filing an I-
589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal form; (3) inter-
viewing with an Asylum Officer. If denied, (4) deportation proceedings
begin in front of an Immigration Judge, where the applicant may request
asylum as a defense; (5) if denied again, the applicant may appeal the
Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA);
(6) if denied by the BIA, the applicant may appeal the ruling of the Board of
Immigration Appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeal of the United States.55
The deportation proceedings process is the same as the affirmative pro-
cess, except for commencing at step (4). For the purposes of this note,
only steps (4)-(6) are relevant.
B. Definition of "Refugee" and "Persecution"
The immigration law of the United States is ever-growing and com-
plex.56 Much of this complexity comes from the competing policy goals of
accepting immigrants, but limiting the number of immigrants successfully
accepted to those that "deserve" to stay.57 Partly to satisfy these competing
KLA officials ... were active in the formation of... the Albanian National Army, ANA,
which operated in Macedonia.").
53. SeeJuDAH, supra note 11, at 97-98.
54. See Vincente A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in
Asylum Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 411, 422-23 (1994).
55. See id. at 422-26. See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Affirma-
tive Asylum Procedures Manual, November 2007, 5-50, available at http://www.uscis.
gov/files/nativedocuments/AffrmAsyManFNL.pdf. Notably only the circuit court opin-
ions are fully available to the public. A few "notable" BIA opinions designated for publi-
cation are also available, but most BIA decisions remain restricted to anyone but the
applicant herself, making research on BIA decisions difficult to impossible.
56. See GoRDON, supra note 5, at § 1.01 (2008).
57. See id. "The subject owes its mazelike quality in part to the conflict between the
positive experience of the United States as a 'nation of immigrants' and the considera-
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policies, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which provides the
basis for asylum law, authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to
grant asylum to a noncitizen of the United States that meets the definition
of a refugee. 58
The INA defines a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 59
This definition clarifies that, to qualify for asylum in the United States,
an applicant must demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution on the basis of one of the five enumerated
grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 60
Because the INA does not define the term "persecution," the definition
of the term has evolved through case law.6 1 The case law definition of
"persecution" has been very fact-dependent and has come to include acts
as severe as imprisonment and torture as well less harmful acts such as
confiscation of property.6 2 The First Circuit explained that, while persecu-
tion is a broader concept than "threats to life or freedom," it does not
extend to "mere harassment or annoyance." 6 3 The court then further elab-
orated that "[bletween these broad margins, courts have tended to consider
the subject on an ad hoc basis."6 4 The Second Circuit expanded the defini-
tion of persecution to explicitly include "non-life threatening violence and
physical abuse."'6 5 While agreeing that many non-life threatening acts con-
stitute persecution, courts have continually clarified that the definition of
tions... for limiting the number and kind of those 'whom we shall welcome."' (citations
omitted).
58. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). See also GORDON, supra note 5, at
§ 33.04[l][c].
59. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
60. Id. If an applicant does not meet some of these requirements, he or she may still
qualify for humanitarian asylum. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii), 1208(b)(1)(iii). The
applicant could also have recourse under the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). G.A. Res.
39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), available
at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/international/UNconventionjtorture.pdf. Because
these two alternate methods are much harder to obtain for Kosovar asylum-seekers, they
are not analyzed in this note.
61. See GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.04[2].
62. See id.
63. See Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999).
64. See id.
65. See Chen v. U.S. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Begzatowksi v.
INS, 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002), and Liao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67
(2d Cir. 2002)).
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persecution does not include all acts deemed offensive. 66
Although the BIA has not attempted to provide a concrete definition of
persecution, it has provided some insight on the parameters of the term. 67
Persecution, according to the BIA is
the infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon per-
sons who differ in a way regarded as offensive (e.g., race, religion, political
opinion, etc.) in a manner condemned by civilized governments. The harm
or suffering need not [only] be physical, but may take other forms, such as
the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the depriva-
tion of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life.
68
The term "under government sanction" does not mean that the govern-
ment must affirmatively sanction the offensive acts. Instead, the BIA has
interpreted the statutory language to require that the persecutors are forces
that the government is either "unable or unwilling to control."6 9
As the INA makes clear, an applicant can qualify for asylum only after
demonstrating either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per-
secution.70 The "well-founded fear" standard was clarified by the Supreme
Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.7 1 According to the Court, the standard
was more generous than the "clear probability" standard that governs
restrictions on removal.7 2 Instead of this clear probability standard, the
difficulty of meeting the "well-founded fear" standard depends on the facts
of each case.73 However, an applicant does not have to prove "that it is
more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home
country."74 In fact, all the applicant must show is that "persecution is a
reasonable possibility," and, for example, even a ten percent chance of
future persecution could meet the "well-founded fear" of future persecution
standard.7 5 The Court stated that
[t]here is simply no room... for concluding that because an applicant only
has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he
or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event happening.... [So long as an
objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that
the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that perse-
cution is a reasonable possibility. 76
66. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining persecution as an
"extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as
offensive").
67. See Matter of Laipenieks, 18 1. & N. Dec. 433, 456-57 (BIA 1983), rev'd on other
grounds 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
69. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
70. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
71. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
72. Id. at 449-50.
73. Id. at 448.
74. Id. at 449.
75. Id. at 440
76. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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The "well-founded fear" standard includes both subjective and objec-
tive components, requiring that the applicant show that his or her fear is
subjectively genuine, and that this fear has an objective, reasonable basis.77
This standard therefore requires a court to consider both the applicant's
state of mind (the subjective component), as well as whether that state of
mind is reasonable (the objective component). 78 Although courts often
assume that an applicant has satisfied the subjective component, the objec-
tive component is harder to establish.79 To satisfy the objective compo-
nent, applicants must demonstrate that the fear is reasonable by producing
"credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record."80 The asylum appli-
cant must demonstrate that his or her persecutor has the capability and
inclination to punish the applicant for a characteristic that the persecutor
knows or could find out about the applicant.8" The applicant may either
provide evidence showing that he or she will be individually targeted for
persecution, or, in some situations, the applicant can provide evidence
showing that he or she is similarly situated to others that the persecutors
target.82
The asylum applicant must show that his or her persecution has come
or will come on account of one or more of the five enumerated grounds.8 3
These grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, and political opinion.8 4 For the applicant's persecution to be
"on account of' one of the enumerated grounds, the REAL ID act requires
the ground to be "at least one central reason" for persecution.85 The REAL
77. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The objective
component ensures that the alien's subject fear is 'well-founded' in fact and not in fan-
tasy .... What is critical is that the alien prove his fear is subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable.") (citations omitted). See also GORDON, supra note 5, at
§ 33.0412][a][ii].
78. GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.04[2][a][ii].
79. E.g., Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) ("We assume, for argu-
ment's sake, that Ang has satisfied the subjective component, that is that he genuinely
fears persecution were he to return to Cambodia. Even so, Ang still must satisfy the
objective component of the test."); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir.
1986) ("IF]ear is a state of apprehension or anxiety not usually subject to rational
measurement.").
80. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987) (listing the ele-
ments that an asylum applicant must meet to satisfy the objective component of well-
founded fear).
82. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii), 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); M.A. v. U.S. INS, 858 F.2d 210,
214 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (rehearing en
banc) ("We interpret the petitioner's burden to produce specific, objective evidence of a
'good reason' to fear persecution, not to require evidence that demonstrates that the
petitioner has individually been threatened by the authorities. Rather, the petitioner
ought to be able to adduce objective evidence that members of his group, which includes
those with the same political beliefs of the petitioner, are routinely subject to persecu-
tion.") (citations omitted).
83. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
84. Id.
85. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat.
231.
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ID act likely requires more proof of causation than previously required. 86
Despite this change, however, the new language preserves the possibility
that the persecutor is acting on mixed motives.8 7 Furthermore, as in many
of the Kosovar asylum applicant cases, the applicant's refugee status need
not be based on only one of the grounds, and the courts need not parse out
the exact protected ground if more than one protected ground is
implicated. 8 8
Finally, an asylum applicant that satisfactorily demonstrates past per-
secution on account of one of the five enumerated grounds 89 is presumed
to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 90 There are, however,
two caveats to this presumption in favor of a well-founded fear. First, the
applicant will only have a presumption of well-founded fear of future perse-
cution if the basis for future persecution is on the same protected ground
as the basis for the past persecution. 9 1 Second, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) can rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution by showing that the applicant could relocate safely
within the applicant's own country.9 2 The DHS can also rebut the pre-
sumption by introducing evidence showing that there have been funda-
mental changes in the applicant's country such that the applicant's fear of
future persecution can no longer be well-founded. 9 3
C. The Jurisprudence of Changed Country Conditions
The DHS can rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution by introducing evidence that there have been fundamental
changes in the applicant's country which make the applicant's fear of
returning not well-founded. 94 Such changes may include, for example, a
change in government from a government hostile to the applicant to one
86. See Marisa S. Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is
a False Promise, 43 HAxv. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 118 (2006) ("[Use of the term "central"
creates opportunity for adjudicators to require more proof of causation ....
87. See GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.04[3].
88. See id. at § 33.04[4]. Kosovar applicants, for example, may claim refugee status
on account of religion, nationality, political opinion and membership in a social group
when complaining of persecution at the hands of the prior Serbian government. They
may also claim persecution on the grounds of political opinion and membership in a
social group when complaining of persecution at the hands of Albanian extremists.
89. In the Ninth Circuit, an applicant does not have to show that he or she was
singled out to establish past persecution, it suffices to show that the persecution was on
account of a protected ground. See Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir.
2004) ("While proof of particularized persecution is sometimes required to establish a
well-founded fear of future persecution, such proof of particularized persecution is not
required to establish past persecution.").
90. See GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.04[2][b][i].
91. See id.
92. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (stating that if the appli-
cant could relocate to another part of his or her country and avoid persecution there, "it
would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so").
93. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). See also Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec.
915, 919 (BIA 1997).
94. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
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tolerant of the applicant. 95 "Further, if an 'appreciable portion' of refugee
claims arise from a particular country so that Immigration Judges have
developed expertise in that country's current conditions, judges can take
administrative notice of a change in those conditions without citing to
record evidence."'96 However, the Immigration Judge must apply the
change to the applicant's claims.9 7
Evidence of changed country conditions often comes in the form of
U.S. State Department reports. 98 Immigration Judges, the BIA, and circuit
courts have often relied on these reports as the best source of information
on conditions within foreign states, even though courts have admitted that
reliance on these reports is problematic. 9 9 This heavy reliance on State
Department reports received a boost from the Supreme Court in INS v.
Ventura,100 where the Court ruled that, even though the country report at
issue was ambiguous, it was appropriate for the BIA to construe it "in light
of its own expertise."'1 1 However, adjudicators must not rely solely on the
State Department reports to the exclusion of evidence produced by the
applicant,10 2 nor can they rely on general evidence in the State Depart-
ment reports to find an applicant's testimony incredible, or pick and
choose facts from the reports while ignoring evidence in the reports
95. See, e.g., Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is undisputed
that the fall of Mengistu resulted in a new regime rather than an orderly substitution of
ministers or parties in a continuing government. Such a change in conditions is suffi-
cient, in the absence of any countervailing showing by Dhine, to support a finding on a
preponderance of evidence test that conditions in Ethiopia have so changed that Dhine
no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he were to return.").
96. GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.04[5][e] (citing Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d
179, 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Circu v. Gonzalez 450 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006)).
97. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 328 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The I's extremely
general observation that, in the wake of Milosevic's withdrawal of influence over Monte-
negro, 'the government of Montenegro has shown signs of self-determination' does noth-
ing to refute Berishaj's claims of police-initiated persecution.").
98. See Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 531 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The country reports
relied upon by the J constitute substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that
country conditions in Albania have improved to the point that any presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution is rebutted."). See also GORDON, supra note 5, at
§ 33.04[5][e].
99. Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Although this circuit
acknowledges that State Department reports may be problematic sources on which to
rely,... in other cases we adopt the view that such reports 'are generally the best source
of information on conditions in foreign nations."') (citations omitted). The heavy reli-
ance on State Department reports is particularly problematic in the Kosovo context. See
infra Part V.
100. 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 17.
102. See Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 302-03 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that
the State Department reports' "observations do not automatically discredit contrary evi-
dence presented by the applicant, and they are not binding on the immigration court....
In addition, the immigration court cannot assume that a report produced by the State
Department-an agency of the Executive Branch of Government that is necessarily
bound to be concerned to avoid abrading relations with other countries, especially other
major world powers-presents the most accurate picture of human rights in the country
at issue. We note the widely held view that the State Department's reports are sometimes
skewed toward the governing administration's foreign-policy goals and concerns.").
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favorable to the applicant. 103 The Seventh Circuit has criticized the BIA's
heavy reliance on the State Department reports, noting that it has a ten-
dency to treat the reports as "Holy Writ."' 10 4 Finally, various circuit courts
have chastised the BIA for shirking its responsibilities due to its practice of
often basing its decisions on outdated State Department reports in finding
that country conditions have substantially improved for the asylum
applicant. 10 5
The U.S. Department of State is not the only source of country reports
on human rights violations. Prominent private organizations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also release similar
reports. There have been cases where immigration tribunals have used
such reports as evidence of country conditions, 10 6 but this practice is not
widespread, and is, at most, limited to supplementing the overall record of
current country conditions. 10 7 In fact, some immigration tribunals have
viewed these private organizations' reports as replete with problems and
bias, and they therefore play a much less prominent role in immigration
tribunal decisions than do State Department reports. 10 8
111. Facts of Typical Kosovar Asylum-Seeker Applications
A. Persecution at the Hands of the Serbian Military
Most Kosovar asylum-seekers, among other claims for persecution,
include stories of torture and degradation at the hands of the Serbian mili-
tary and paramilitary forces both before and during the Kosovo conflict of
1998-1999. Their mistreatment included imprisonment for false reasons,
mortal threats, severe beatings, and even killings of family members. All of
these methods of persecution have been alleged by the petitioner in Maliqi
v. Attorney General of the U.S. 10 9 Mr. Maliqi had been arrested six times,
and during the last arrest, which occurred in March 1999, he was falsely
103. GORDON, supra note 5, at § 33.041511g] (citing cases from the First, Seventh and
Ninth circuits).
104. Gallina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
105. See, e.g., Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004) (chastising the
BIA in stating that "[t]he 'reasoning' of the 1J is open to ridicule,... and the administra-
tive record is a hoary relic: For example, the most recent country report was thirty-five
months out-of-date at the time the BIA rendered its decision, and as of this writing, is
fifty-four months out-of-date.... Setting aside our perplexity at how the BIA apparently
thought the 1J's opinion worthy of being the 'final agency determination,' we do not
understand why the BIA did not intervene to supplement the record in a weak case");
Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2002); Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 654
(9th Cir. 2000).
106. See Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. See M.A. v. U.S. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 1990)
108. See id. (agreeing with the BIA decision not to recognize the private reports, and
further elaborating that "[a] standard of-asylum eligibility based solely on pronounce-
ments of private organizations or the news media is problematic almost to the point of
being non-justiciable .... Although we do not wish to disparage the work of private
investigative bodies in exposing inhumane practices, these organizations may have their
own agendas and concerns, and their condemnations are virtually omnipresent").
109. 262 F. App'x 426 (3d Cir. 2008).
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accused of assisting the Kosovo Liberation Army and detained and beaten
at the police station for four days. 110 Serbian police forces also shot and
killed Maliqi's father on March 21, 1999, three days prior to the NATO
intervention. 11' Similar claims of imprisonment, threats and beatings
appear in the brief for petitioner in the case of Shalaj v. Gonzales.112 In
that case, Shalaj's father had been arrested three times from 1990 to 1992
because of his anti-Serbian government activities. During these arrests,
Shalaj's father was beaten severely, and as a result of numerous blows to
the head in the last of these arrests, he slipped into a coma and died. 113
Other methods of persecution at the hands of the Serbian forces
included forced expulsions and even rape. According to the Shalaj peti-
tioner brief, Shalaj and his family were forced to leave their homes and
were forced to go to Montenegro. 114 During the forced trip there, Shalaj
was separated from his family and Serbian forces took him away with
approximately 120 other males, some of whom were executed. 115 Shalaj
was one of the lucky ones, surviving and staying at Rozi, Montenegro for
three weeks, later reuniting with his family and returning home after the
NATO campaign to find that his house had been burned down. 116 Mean-
while, the petitioner in Nikollbibaj v. Gonzales' 17 alleged that Serbian
police officers took him to a police station, and while he was detained, five
Serbian police officers raped his wife in front of her daughter, mother-in-
law, sister-in-law, and other family members.118
B. Persecution at the Hands of the KLA
Most recent Kosovar asylum-seekers have alleged that they, at least in
part, fear returning to Kosovo because they fear that the Kosovo Liberation
Army will persecute them. As part of their applications, these asylum-seek-
ers allege that, after the end of the Kosovo conflict, former members of the
KLA committed different kinds of atrocities against them and caused them
to fear for their lives. An example of KLA pressure toward members of the
LDK party who did not fight in the Kosovo conflict is the story of fear told
by Fatos Shalaj. According to Shalaj, he was constantly harassed by KLA
members upon returning to Kosovo after the conflict. 1 9 Besides constant
harassment and threats, Shalaj was attacked one night in May 2003 by two
masked individuals and was brutally beaten for approximately twenty min-
110. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Maliqi v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 262 F. App'x 426 (3d
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3169), 2007 U.S. 3rd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 993. Brief of Petitioner used
because Circuit Court opinions are generally very short and do not lay out all the facts
presented by the applicants.
111. Id.
112. Brief for Petitioner, Shalaj v. Gonzales, 229 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-
4306), 2006 U.S. 2nd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 203
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 4-5.
116. Id.
117. 232 F. App'x 546 (6th Cir. 2007).
118. Id. at 550.
119. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 112, at 5.
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utes. 120 This attack was followed by numerous threatening phone calls. 12 1
Similarly, Fitim Balaj was an LDK supporter (becoming a party mem-
ber in 1997) who faced constant pressure and threats from KLA mem-
bers. 12 2 According to Balaj, in October 2002, as he and his wife walked
home after an LDK meeting, three masked men stopped them and warned
them to discontinue their LDK activities. 12 3 After the threats, one of the
masked men hit Balaj over the head with a gun, and, while Balaj was
unconscious, the masked men threatened to rape his wife. Luckily, other
LDK members who had left the meeting stopped the masked men from
continuing. In March 2004, a car bomb exploded outside the Balaj resi-
dence during the night, shattering the windows and injuring the family.
For Balaj this was the straw that broke the camel's back, and he left Kosovo
that same day. 12 4
An even more startling story of horror at the hands of the KLA is that
of Pal Gojani. 125 Gojani had been a member of the LDK since 1989.126 In
1998, during the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, KLA members tried
to recruit Gojani to fight with them. 127 Gojani refused to join and the KLA
members told Gojani to leave his village or else they would consider him a
traitor. On June 13, 1999, Gojani's wife and cousin disappeared and were
later found dead. On July 21, 1999, approximately one month later, KLA
members returned to Gojani's house but were told that he had left for Alba-
nia. Gojani remained in hiding until after NATO had taken control of the
area fearing that the KLA would kill him. After the end of the war, Gojani
opened a cafe with his brother. Shortly after the caf6 opened, two men
came and threatened Gojani because of his LDK membership. Within a
week of the incident, Gojani's cafe was burned down and a note was left for
him that read "we are going to bake you like a sheep." Gojani fled Kosovo
after this incident. 12 8
IV. How Courts Have Used Changed Country Conditions to Rebut
Presumption in Favor of Well-Founded Fear of Future
Persecution
The case law on Kosovar applicants includes cases in which the circuit
courts have corrected the mistakes of the BIA when evaluating the pre-
sumption that future fear of persecution is well-founded. An example of a
circuit court correctly pointing out that the BIA had not "conduct[ed] an
individualized analysis of whether the changes in conditions ... were so
120. Id.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Balaj v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 265 F. App'x 82 (3d Cir. 2008).
123. Id. at 83-84.
124. Id. at 84.
125. Gojani v. Mukasey, 266 F. App'x 420 (6th Cir. 2008).
126. Id. at 421
127. Id. At least part of Gojani's reason for not joining was religious. Gojani sought
asylum on both bases of political opinion and religion. See id.
128. Id.
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fundamental that they were sufficient to rebut the presumption that...
fear of persecution is well founded" is Alibasic v. Mukasey.12 9 In that case,
the BIA had used the 2004 State Department Country Report for Serbia
and Montenegro (Kosovo was not yet an independent country and was
included in that report) to find that the presumption of well-founded fear
of future persecution had been rebutted. 130 As the Second Circuit noted,
the BIA only relied on facts in the State Department report that favored its
conclusion and ignored other facts included in the report that supported
Alibasic's claims.' 3 ' The court also stated in a footnote that "'where a
report suggests that, in general, an [applicant] would not suffer or reasona-
bly fear persecution in a particular country,' the immigration court is still
'obligated to consider ... contrary or countervailing evidence ... as well as
the particular circumstances of the applicant's case .... "132
Circuit courts have not always taken the BIA to task for making gen-
eral and sweeping assumptions about changed country conditions based
on State Department reports. In fact circuit courts have, at times, them-
selves made general arguments for why country conditions have
changed. 13 3 One such example is Gojani v. Mukasey.134 As described
above, 13 5 Gojani alleged a number of instances of persecution, including
an incident in which members of the Kosovo Liberation Army made threats
against his life, destroyed his cafe, and may have also been involved in the
abduction and murder of his wife and cousin.136 On November 12, 2004,
the Immigration Judge denied Gojani's application for asylum and ordered
him deported. 137 Part of the Immigration Judge's reasoning for denying
Gojani's application was that "even if Gojani had established past persecu-
tion, the country reports submitted by the government demonstrated
changed country conditions which would rebut any presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution." 138 The changed country conditions
upon which the judge based his opinion included portions of the 2003
State Department report that indicated that the LDK was the largest politi-
cal party in Kosovo and that Albanians were politically in control of
Kosovo. 139
129. 547 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
130. Id. at 86.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 87 n.6 (quoting Chen v. U.S. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004))
(emphasis in original).
133. For every case that shows that the BIA or the circuit courts made general
assumptions about country conditions, there are many more cases that are unpublished
and therefore impossible to review. See Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual, supra
note 55.
134. Gojani, 266 F. App'x at 420.
135. See supra Part III.B.
136. See Gojani, 266 F. App'x at 421.
137. Id. at 421-22.
138. Id. at 422
139. Id.
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On June 19, 2006, the BIA summarily adopted and affirmed the Immi-
gration Judge's decision in a one paragraph order. The BIA's affirmance
stated in part:
We adopt and affirm the decision of the Immigration Judge who found that
even had the respondent been credible and had he established past persecu-
tion, which we do not concede, there have been material and substantial
changed country conditions sufficient to rebut the respondent's presump-
tion of a well-founded fear of persecution. 140
The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the BIA's and Immigration Judge's
decision on February 20, 2008, ruling that the decision to deny Gojani's
application for asylum was supported by substantial evidence.
14 1
The decision to deny Gojani's application, at least insofar as the claim
concerning changed country conditions matters, is wrong. If Gojani was
indeed able to establish past persecution, he would then have had a pre-
sumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. In order for his
application for asylum to be denied, the DHS needs to prove that condi-
tions in Kosovo had changed so much that he no longer had a well-founded
fear of persecution in the future. As the Supreme Court stated in Cardoza-
Fonseca, even a ten percent chance of future persecution may suffice to
meet the well-founded fear standard. 142 The Gojani court, however,
ignored these precedents with its use and application of State Department
reports.
Gojani entered the United States on January 13, 2003.143 Although
the decision does not state the actual date that Gojani left Kosovo, it is
reasonable to assume that he left a short time before the date on which he
entered the United States.144 Therefore, the argument the courts made in
Gojani's case was that country conditions changed substantially within the
year that he left Kosovo. Of note is the assertion that part of the purported
changed country conditions was the existence of the LDK as the largest
political party in Kosovo. 14 5 This fact, however, was also true of conditions
in Kosovo before Gojani's departure. 146 Two other factors that the Immi-
gration Judge noted, and the BIA and Sixth Circuit adopted in showing
changed country conditions to rebut the presumption in favor of Gojani,
included the fact that Albanians were politically in control of Kosovo and
that peaceful elections had been held. 1 47 The same argument exists with
these factors: Albanians had been in control of Kosovo since the NATO
140. Id.
141. Id. at 424.
142. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
143. Gojani, 266 F. App'x at 421.
144. The decision states that Gojani traveled through Albania to Canada and from
there entered the United States on January 13, 2003. Id. Unless he had the luck of
Odysseus, the assumption that he left Kosovo within a short time of his arrival date to
the United States is reasonable.
145. Id. at 422.
146. The LDK won each election before the 2007 elections, when it was ousted by the
PDK. See supra notes 31-33.
147. Gojani, 266 F. App'x at 422.
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intervention (circa 1999), and the "peaceful" elections in the 2003 State
Department Report that the IJ, BIA and Sixth Circuit relied on were the
2002 municipal elections, which also took place prior to Gojani's depar-
ture from KOSOVO. 1 4 8 In sum, the purported "change" had occurred before
Gojani's departure, and, therefore, if Gojani had actually proven past perse-
cution, it could not be used to rebut the presumption in his favor concern-
ing a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Another reason for finding changed country conditions in Kosovo was
the 2003 State Department Report's assertion that LDK enjoyed broad sup-
port in Kosovo. 149 This assertion, whether true or not, is immaterial to
Gojani's asylum application. Gojani had not complained that the LDK was
out of favor in Kosovo, rather he complained that his fear of return arose
primarily from the existence of KLA members who tormented LDK mem-
bers and mistreated them for their political beliefs. 150 Gojani's fear was, in
actuality, centered on the fact that the LDK, although in power, had been
unable to control the extremists that targeted its members. This is the
exact worry that was recognized as legitimate and worthy of granting asy-
lum in Matter of Acosta.15 1
Furthermore, while using the 2003 State Department Report, the
Immigration Judge, BIA and the Sixth Circuit focused only on the facts that
may suggest a better situation for Gojani in Kosovo. This is the problem
that the Second Circuit noted in Alibasic v. Mukasey in overturning the BIA
decision. 15 2 In Gojani, the 2003 State Department Report also included
facts that supported the applicant's asylum claims. For example, the report
stated that "some unidentified gangs appeared in the village of Kodrali,
Decan municipality, and harassed several LDK supporters."'15 3 According
to the report, "[tihe media reported on May 13 that Pristina Mayor Ismet
Beqiri received a threatening letter claiming to be from the AKSh similar to
the one Member of Parliament Fatmir Rexhepi (LDK) received a few days
before."'154 The report also lists a number of LDK party members that had
been killed in the previous year (2002).155 None of these facts, which were
also included in the 2003 State Department Report, and which were argua-
bly more material to Gojani's case, were mentioned in the opinion. The
decision to skip over these facts is disheartening because the same State
148. 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Serbia and Montenegro,
Kosovo, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27874.htm.
149. Gojani, 266 F. App'x at 423.
150. Id. at 421.
151. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
152. Alibasic v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2008).
153. 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Serbia and Montenegro,
Kosovo, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27874.htm.
154. Id.
155. Id. (listing the killings of Smajl Hajdaraj, an LDK member of the Kosovo Assem-
bly, Uke Bytyci, an LDK member and Mayor of Suhareke/Suva Reka municipality, Bekim
Kastrati, journalist for LDK-linked newspaper, Bota Sot, and Besim Dajaku, an LDK
bodyguard).
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Department report that the Sixth Circuit used to argue that country condi-
tions had changed also provided sufficient evidence to allow Mr. Gojani to
meet the ten percent standard of well-founded fear of future persecution
from Cardoza-Fonseca.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit decision on Gojani's case was handed down
on February 20, 2008. By this time, many changes had taken place in
Kosovo. For example, in the 2007 general assembly elections, the PDK had
finally unseated the LDK, which arguably made Gojani's return to Kosovo
even more dangerous. 156 Meanwhile, the opinion of the case cites to the
2003 State Department Report in making the claim that the conditions in
Kosovo had changed sufficiently to rebut Gojani's presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit could only
review the BIA decision under the "substantial evidence" standard,
15 7
requiring the Sixth Circuit to overturn the BIA decision only if it was "not
'supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.' 5 8 Due to this limited standard of review, the
Sixth Circuit decision and its reliance on a five-year-old State Department
report, is justifiable. However, the policy argument made in Berishaj v.
Ashcroft concerning the improper use of outdated State Department
reports to find changed country conditions remains. 159
Similarly careless assertions about changed country conditions also
appear in the circuit court opinions of Gashi v. U.S. Attorney General,
1 60
and Balaj v. Attorney General of the United States.16 1 In Gashi, the court
stated that the BIA "believed that the evidence demonstrated that condi-
tions in Kosovo had changed for the better since Gashi's incidents of perse-
cution and that Gashi could have asked the government for help, since his
party was in power."' 16 2 It is hard to imagine (and the opinion does not
provide) what the basis for finding the changed country conditions in
Gashi's case may have been. Gashi had alleged that he feared members of
the extremist Democratic Party (PDK) who had previously abducted,
threatened and beaten him. 16 3 The fact that the LDK was in power is
immaterial to Gashi's application (as also noted above in the discussion of
Gojani), and, in either case, the LDK had been in power since before Gashi
fled Kosovo. Unfortunately, Gashi filed an untimely petition for review of
the BIA's decision, 164 and thus the BIA's "belief' about country conditions
in Kosovo was never reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit.
In Balaj, among other dicta, the Third Circuit opinion states that
"[e]ven if Balaj had carried his burden of proof as to past persecution, he
156. See Adam Carr's Election Archive, Legislative Election of 17 November 2007,
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/k/kosovo/kosovo2007.txt.
157. Gojani v. Mukasey, 266 F. App'x 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008).
158. Id. (quoting Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 2004)).
159. Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004).
160. 288 F. App'x 629 (11th Cir. 2008).
161. 265 F. App'x 82 (3d Cir. 2008).
162. Gashi, 288 F. App'x at 633.
163. Id. at 632.
164. Id. at 633.
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would not be entitled to relief, because country conditions in Kosovo have
changed such that he need not fear future persecution."'16 5 The reasons
cited for the changed country conditions once again involve the fact that
the LDK was in control. 166 This assumption once again suffers from both
irrelevance to the case as well as the fact that LDK had been in control
since before Balaj's departure. If Balaj had indeed carried his burden of
proof as to past persecution, evidence of changed country conditions
would need to rebut any presumption of well-founded fear of future perse-
cution, including the hypothetical ten percent chance of future persecution
stated in Cardoza-Fonseca.16
7
V. Why State Department Reports Do Not Always Tell the Full Story
A. When Generalized Assessments of Changed Country Conditions Are
Acceptable
It has previously been argued and accepted that U.S. Department of
State Country Reports are often the most reliable source of country condi-
tions. 168 There are certainly situations in which State Department reports
can be very reliable and should be used by the courts as important evi-
dence of a change in country conditions. In the context of Kosovo, State
Department reports can and should be used as reliable evidence of the fact
that ethnic Albanians are now politically in control of Kosovo, and that
Kosovo has declared its independence. Therefore any presumption in favor
of a well-founded fear of future persecution as it pertains to persecution
from Serbs is unquestionably rebutted, even under the ten percent thresh-
old of Cardoza-Fonseca.16 9
One country that presents similar circumstances with regard to gen-
eral assumptions arising from State Department reports which do suffice
in rebutting the presumption of a well-founded fear is Albania. Albania is
one of Kosovo's neighboring countries, and the historical connection
between the two states goes back many years. 170 Albanian asylum-seeker
claims often cite to past persecution during the communist regime that
ruled from the end of World War II until 1992.171 The case of Hoxhallari v.
165. Balaj, 265 F. App'x at 85-86.
166. Id. at 86.
167. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
168. Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2004).
169. That would change if Serbia regains control of Kosovo. That outcome, however,
is unlikely considering the growing number of countries that have recognized Kosovo as
an independent state. For more, see supra note 37.
170. In fact many Kosovars were hoping for a reunification with Albania rather than
independence for Kosovo as its own republic. See Dan Bilefsky, Kosovo Struggles to Forge
an Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at A20. Kosovo had previously been part of Alba-
nia, including during World War II when it was part of the Albanian Kingdom. See Time-
line: Kosovo, A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEws, Nov. 13, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/countryprofiles/3550401 .stm.
171. Henry Kamm, Ex-Communists Lose in Albania Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at
A3.
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Gonzales1 72 presents typical claims. According to Hoxhallari, "[tihe Com-
munist regime seized the property of his once well-to-do family, and
interned them for a decade ending in 1988."'17 3 His family further suffered
discrimination and his father was arrested, beaten, and threatened during
the periods of the communist regime. 174
Hoxhallari's application was denied in part because the Immigration
Judge found that "fundamental political changes after 1991 adequately
rebutted any presumption of future persecution." 175 The BIA affirmed
without opinion, 176 and the Second Circuit denied Hoxhallari's petition
for review.17 7 In its opinion, the Second Circuit stated that it was unrea-
sonable to "assume that an IJ comes to each case ignorant of the history,
political status, and evolving conditions in countries from which many
petitioners seek asylum."'1 78 The Second Circuit further elaborated that in
cases where "changed conditions evidently prevail in a country that is the
subject of an appreciable portion of asylum claims ...an immigration
judge need not enter specific findings premised on record evidence when
making a finding of changed country conditions under the INA."'179
The fact that Albanians-even those that had been previously perse-
cuted under the communist regime-have no well-founded fear of future
persecution from communists is well-known. Although communist rule
lasted for nearly half a century, Albania has been free of communism for
19 years.180 Since the fall of communism, many of the previously perse-
cuted have received redress for their suffering, with the Assembly of the
Republic of Albania passing laws such as the Law on Innocence, Amnesty,
and Rehabilitation of Ex-political Convicted and Persecuted Persons in
1991.181 Furthermore, many communist leaders, including the widow of
the dictator, Enver Hoxha, have been sentenced to jail terms for atrocities
and crimes committed during the communist years. 18 2 Finally, since its
fall, the Communist Party has failed to gain any seats in the Assembly of
the Republic of Albania. 18 3
172. 468 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006).
173. Id. at 182.
174. Id. Hoxhallari also claimed a number of other incidents occurred in the period
between 1997 and 2000. Id.
175. Id. at 183.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 188
178. Id. at 187.
179. Id.
180. See Tirana Celebrates 19th Anniversary of Fall of Communism, SOUTHEAST EUROPE
TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en-GB/features/
setimes/newsbriefs/2009/12/09/nb-1 1.
181. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Considerations of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: Albania, 'I 5(b)(i), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/ALB (June 21,
2005).
182. See Hoxha's Widow Sentenced, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 28, 1993, at A22.
183. See Adam Carr's Election Archive, Legislative Elections of 28 June 2009, http://
psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/a/albania/albania2009.txt. In fact, the Albanian Par-
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B. The Problems of Generalized Assessments of Changed Country
Conditions in Kosovo
Kosovo presents a unique problem that does not exist in most other
countries from which asylum applicants come from. Unlike Albanians and
other asylum applicants, Kosovars fear persecution from two separate and
mostly unrelated sources. Therefore, although it is obvious that Kosovar
asylum-seekers have no legitimate fears when it comes to a possible return
of Serbian persecution, the same claims cannot stand in reference to KLA
persecutors. In fact, the current conditions in Kosovo are far from improv-
ing for asylum-seekers who claim that extremists from the KLA have tor-
mented them in the past. As of the 2007 elections, the LDK is no longer in
control of Kosovo, losing to the Hashim Thaci-led PDK.18 4 Furthermore,
with Kosovo's independence, extremists may be further emboldened, and
they are likely to experience less oversight by international parties. In gen-
eral, it appears that if a Kosovar asylum applicant has succeeded in proving
past persecution at the hands of KLA extremists, rebutting the presump-
tion of a well-founded fear of future persecution in light of the current con-
ditions is a tall task, and certainly not one that can be achieved by
generally relying on parts of a U.S. Department of State report.
There are several problems with some of the courts' approaches to
using State Department reports in Kosovar asylum application cases. The
first problem is that "the State Department follows criteria much less cen-
tered around the refugee's circumstances than the ten-percent standard for
a well-founded fear of persecution set out in Cardoza-Fonseca."'1 85 In fact,
State Department reports often make sweeping conclusions that ignore cer-
tain facts within the reports. An example of this is the U.S. Department of
State 2008 Human Rights Report on Kosovo. Under the heading of Free-
dom of Speech and Press, the first sentence offers the conclusion that
"[tihe constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and of the press,
and the government and UNMIK generally respected these rights in prac-
tice." 18 6 This broad conclusion, however, is rebutted by the very next sen-
tence, which states that "there were reports of intimidation of reporters,
including by officials in the public sector and government and by politi-
cians and businesses."' 8 7 The report further states that "Ujournalists
reported pressure from politicians and organized crime," that they "were
occasionally offered financial benefits in exchange for positive reporting or
for abandoning an investigation," and that "government agencies withdrew
regular advertising from newspapers that had published critical coverage of
them."188 Although the government may have "generally" respected the
liament banned the Communist Party for a number of years. See Albania Bans Commu-
nists, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at A2.
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. Margulies, supra note 6, at 18-19.
186. 2008 Human Rights Report: Kosovo, U.S. Department of State, February 25,
2009, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119462.htm.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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freedom of the press, the facts presented above would easily meet the ten
percent standard of Cardoza-Fonseca, which is all that is required to meet
the well-founded fear threshold.
Another reason why State Department reports should not be the deter-
mining factor in showing changed country conditions in Kosovo is a reason
recognized by the Second Circuit in Tambadou v. Gonzales, when the court
stated that "the State Department's reports are sometimes skewed toward
the governing administration's foreign-policy goals and concerns."'189 The
State Department's foreign-policy goals concerning Kosovo became clear
the day after Kosovo declared its independence, when the U.S. Department
of State moved quickly to recognize Kosovo. 190 According to an MSNBC
report, "for Washington the declaration of independence by Kosovo vindi-
cated years of dogged effort to help a land achieve its dream of self-determi-
nation after years of ethnic conflict and repression by Serbia."'19 1 Although
President George W. Bush was visiting Tanzania when the declaration of
independence took place, he declared "The Kosovars are now indepen-
dent.'1 9 2 This was not the first time that President Bush had gone on the
record when it came to his views on whether Kosovo should be an indepen-
dent country. During his June 10, 2007 visit to Albania, President Bush
stated that he believed "[a]t some point in time, sooner rather than later,
you've got to say, 'Enough is enough - Kosovo is independent.' "193 As
Tim Judah stated in his book, sometimes outsiders turn a blind eye in
return for stability. 194 The United States clearly has much at stake as a
result of its strong push for Kosovo to achieve independence. Reports sug-
gesting that the situation in Kosovo is not stable would lead to embarrass-
ment in the international arena.
Finally, the heavy deference that courts have lent to the State Depart-
ment reports in effect shifts the burden of proof concerning future persecu-
tion from the DHS to the asylum applicants. In the battle of documents
presented by asylum applicants and State Department reports, the courts
have often deferred to State Department conclusions "to outweigh all but
the most copiously corroborated refugee testimony." 19 5 This has often led
to courts asking for more from the asylum applicants while ignoring "the
unique difficulties of proof associated with 'the circumstances of refugee
flight, exile, and trauma."1 9 6 As a result of this deference to State Depart-
ment conclusions, courts have resolved uncertainty against the asylum
189. Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 2006)
190. See U.S., European Powers Recognize Kosovo, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23219277.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Gets Respite in Albania, Where Thousands Hail Him,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 2007, at A3.
194. See JuDAH, supra note 11, at 97-98.
195. Margulies, supra note 6, at 19.
196. Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Level-
ing the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 203 (2000) (quoting
DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (3d ed. 1999)). See also
Margulies, supra note 6, at 18 ("The trend in proof of changed country conditions is to
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applicant, which results in a shifting of the presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution to a presumption of no fear of returning. As
Peter Margulies argues, "[t]he only way for the asylum-seeker to meet this
heavier burden is to produce a 'smoking gun' - an affidavit from his perse-
cutors stating what they intend to do to him if he returns."'19 7
Therefore, although State Department reports are often viewed as the
most reliable source of country conditions, 198 they present many problems
in the case of Kosovo. Not only are the reports often biased, but the criteria
used by the State Department does not match that which courts of law
must use in determining asylum applications. While State Department
reports may be used as evidence of changed country conditions, courts
must exercise a high degree of caution in accepting the conclusions of the
U.S. Department of State regarding Kosovo.
VI. A New Framework
As stated above, the immigration system of the United States is built
on two competing policies, (1) accepting immigrants while (2) limiting the
number of immigrants to those that "deserve" to stay.1 99 In connection
with Kosovar asylum-seekers, the current jurisprudence of changed coun-
try conditions does not strike the right balance between these two policies.
By deferring too much to the State Department and by only making gener-
alized assessments of country conditions based on the conclusions of the
State Department reports, the immigration tribunals (including courts) are
wrongly limiting the number of immigrants, in effect closing the door to a
number of deserving immigrants and turning away refugees in need of asy-
lum. To better serve the two competing policies behind the immigration
system, I suggest a new framework that changes the emphasis placed on
State Department reports and seeks to better contextualize the conclusions
offered in the reports to each individual case.
A. Individualized Assessments
In Berishaj v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit stated:
[Elvidence of changed country conditions can successfully rebut an alien's
fear of future persecution based on past persecution only if that evidence
addresses the specific basis for the alien's fear of persecution; generalized
improvements in country conditions will not suffice as rebuttals to credible
testimony and other evidence establishing past persecution.20 0
Unfortunately, this rule has not been applied in many asylum cases of
Kosovar applicants. In keeping with the directives of the Third Circuit in
Berishaj v. Ashcroft, the first recommendation I propose in the new frame-
require greater specificity and certainty of the asylum-seeker, and less specificity and
certainty of the government.").
197. Margulies, supra note 6, at 24-25.
198. See Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2004).
199. See GORDON, supra note 5, at § 1.01 (2008).
200. Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2004).
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work is that Immigration Judges, the BIA, and circuit courts make individu-
alized assessments of State Department reports to see if these reports
actually rebut the fear of persecution.
Assuming that an asylum applicant has already met the criteria and
has convinced the Immigration Judge that the applicant has suffered from
persecution in the past, the DHS must then present evidence to rebut the
possibility that the particular incidents may happen in the future. To meet
this burden, courts must require the DHS to present evidence of changed
country conditions that has a one-to-one match with the persecution com-
plained of. Therefore, what the courts must look for in the cases of
Kosovar asylum-seekers include statements such as "no reported politically
motivated killings," or "Kosovo police officers arrested a number of former
KLA members who took part in killing and threatening LDK members," or,
perhaps, "the KLA has officially apologized to the LDK for the threats and
crimes they committed." Courts should stop making general observations
such as those presented in the cases of Gojani, Gashi and Balaj.20 1 If the
well-founded fear of future persecution for those cases is to be rebutted,
then the DHS must provide evidence showing that prior KLA members and
current PDK members have stopped harassing LDK members. This
method would be a way to rebut even the ten percent standard of Cardoza-
Fonseca.
B. Using the Entire State Department Report
State Department reports often make broad and general conclusions
about "improving conditions" in a particular country, even though the
reports themselves offer evidence that counters the conclusion. Very often,
the general conclusion is true because it only speaks of the trend, and
some facts that refute the conclusion do not necessarily make it invalid.
However, it is very dangerous for courts to cite to the conclusions that State
Department reports make without combing through the entire report to see
whether there are facts that tend to disprove the conclusion. The Supreme
Court has stated that even a ten percent chance of future persecution quali-
fies for the well-founded fear standard.20 2 While the conclusion may gen-
erally be true, the facts that cut against the conclusion may be enough to
meet the ten percent standard.
Courts must be very wary of State Department conclusions. Not only
does the State Department use different criteria from what the INA and
case law requires, 20 3 but State Department reports often "offer an apologia
for human rights abuses that is driven by United States foreign policy con-
cerns rather than the safety of refugees." 20 4 In fact, the institutional cul-
ture of the State Department "treats human rights as a distraction from
core policy concerns. '20 5 Because of all these problems, it is important
201. See supra Part IV.
202. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
203. See Margulies, supra note 6, at 18-19.
204. Id. at 34.
205. Id.
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that courts stop relying on State Department conclusions to make their
decisions. Instead, courts must pay careful attention to all the facts
included in the reports, and determine whether any of the facts is enough
to meet the ten percent standard of Cardoza-Fonseca.
C. Decreasing the Reliance on State Department Reports
Perhaps the best and most reliable evidence presented in an asylum
case is the evidence that tends to prove that persecution occurred in the
past. If the immigration hearing has gotten to the point where country
conditions evidence is needed to rebut the well-founded fear in favor of the
applicant, then it is likely that credible evidence of past persecution has
already been presented by the applicant and trusted by the adjudicator.
Courts should also use the evidence of past persecution in making their
determination concerning well-founded fear of future persecution.
Although a State Department report may suggest that there has been a
change for the better in a particular country, the evidence of past persecu-
tion may successfully rebut the report at least insofar as the ten percent
standard of Cardoza-Fonseca is concerned.
The problem of bias that riddles the State Department reports also
exists in evidence that the asylum-seekers may present to show past perse-
cution. It is not hard to imagine that applicants that come from poor coun-
tries, such as Kosovo, likely have an incentive to lie or exaggerate what
actually happened. However, there is an important difference between a
State Department report and evidence of past persecution. While an immi-
gration tribunal will have to either accept or deny the facts in the State
Department report without the ability to cross-examine its maker, the asy-
lum-seeker may be cross-examined in court by the DHS attorney to try and
elicit the truth and lies of the testimony. As the asylum-seeker presents
evidence of past persecution, the DHS attorney may point to parts of a
State Department report and ask the asylum-seeker to reconcile any differ-
ences between the State Department report and the other evidence
presented in the case.
To further decrease the reliance on State Department reports, I suggest
that immigration tribunals consider increasing the use of reports from rep-
utable private independent sources. Such reputable private sources
include Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. These private
organizations also release regular reports that track human rights viola-
tions. 20 6 While "[a] standard of asylum eligibility based solely on pro-
nouncements of private organizations .. . is problematic almost to the
point of being non-justiciable[,]" 20 7 using these reports to counterbalance
and complement State Department reports would not be problematic. In
contrast, the increase in use of private independent organizations' reports
206. See e.g., The History of Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
who-we-are/history (last visited Apr. 9, 2010); Human Rights Watch, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75138#5 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
207. M.A. v. U.S. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 1990).
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would allow the immigration tribunals to better judge whether, and how
heavily, to rely on the broad conclusions of the State Department reports.
VII. Addressing Some Perceived Weaknesses of the Proposed
Framework
As with any proposed framework, the suggestions made herein may
have perceived weaknesses that call into question the ability of the frame-
work to improve the current system of deferential use of State Department
reports. Below I respond to some of these perceived weaknesses, and
demonstrate why the suggested framework remains preferable to the cur-
rent system.
A. The Difficulty of Making Individualized Assessment in Cases of Past
Persecution that Occurred Many Years Before
One argument against the proposed changes is that it is difficult to
make individualized assessments of changed country conditions in cases
where the alleged persecution occurred a number of years before. This
argument is a valid point of concern, and suggests that the current deferen-
tial framework of generalized assessment is the one used, in part, because
the passing of time makes it hard for courts to assess past persecution
claims side-by-side with current country conditions as described by the
Department of State. Although this point remains valid, a system that
requires courts to make side-by-side comparisons between the credible evi-
dence of past persecution that asylum applicants present and the State
Department reports is superior to a system that defers broadly to general
conclusions contained in the latter.
B. State Department Reports Often Used Because They Are the Only
Source Available
Another argument for why State Department reports play an impor-
tant role in asylum cases is that often the country reports are the only
evidence available to determine current country conditions. This concern,
however, is overstated. To get to the point where there is a need to rebut a
well-founded fear of future persecution, an asylum-seeker must have
already proven with credible and convincing evidence that persecution
occurred in the past. The documents that make up the evidence of past
persecution are documents that also play a role in determining the likeli-
hood of future persecution. Although documents from the past do not
show the current conditions of a country, they are useful when compared
to State Department reports to aid in determining the likelihood that
"changes" noted in the reports may or may not affect the form of persecu-
tion alleged.
Further, the U.S. Department of State is not the only source of country
conditions. Numerous independent organizations also monitor for human
rights abuses and release regular reports on such abuses. Under my frame-
work immigration tribunals would still consider State Department Reports,
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the proposed change merely decreases their importance and decreases the
improper deference to them. Therefore, the argument that State Depart-
ment reports are the only evidence of current country conditions entirely
misses the point. Not only are there are other reputable sources of current
country conditions, but in cases where past persecution has successfully
been proven, there are other documents that can supplement the State
Department reports and help the courts make individualized determina-
tions of the applicants' fears. Such documents would include the evidence
of past persecution (i.e. photographs, letters, other hard evidence as well as
asylum applicants' testimony) that succeeded in convincing the tribunal
that the asylum-seeker indeed suffered from persecution in the past.
C. Does the New Framework Tip the Balance Too Heavily In Favor of
Admitting Too Many Immigrants?
Finally, any new framework must be mindful of the policy choices that
make up the immigration system. While the United States desires to pro-
vide asylum for those who face persecution in their countries, the United
States cannot grant asylum to all who apply and must only grant it to those
who "deserve" it. Although the current system tips the balance too heavily
in favor of denying deserving asylum applicants, 20 8 there may be a similar
concern that the approach I suggest, considering the emphasis placed on
evidence of past persecution, tips the balance too heavily in favor of admit-
ting too many asylum applicants who do not deserve to stay. It is true that
under my proposed framework some asylum-seekers could fabricate evi-
dence of past persecution and end up with asylum. However, there are
some safeguards against this danger in the proposed framework. One of
these safeguards is in the nature of the past persecution evidence used to
determine fear of future persecution. As argued, this evidence must have
first convinced the Immigration Judge that it is credible. Further, in the
framework I suggest that the DHS be allowed to cross-examine the asylum-
seekers not only about their evidence of past persecution, but also about
how events included in the State Department reports may affect their case.
While some unscrupulous applicants may gain asylum, it is improper to
use this fear to keep out refugees that are in risk of dire consequences upon
their return to Kosovo.
Conclusion
The situation in Kosovo continues to remain unsettled. Although
Kosovo is now an independent country and fear of ethnical persecution
has receded, persecution on the basis of political beliefs has not yet ended.
Kosovo presents a unique problem because most Kosovar asylum-seekers
present claims for past persecution that have two separate bases. Further-
more, Kosovo's international prominence comes almost exclusively from
the extensive coverage of the Serbian problem, while the ongoing political
208. See supra Part V1.
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instability remains largely ignored by the international arena. Because of
these unique features, Kosovo presents the perfect case study for investigat-
ing how courts defer to State Department reports, resulting in decisions
that ignore both asylum law as well as the policies behind it. To fix this
problem, Immigration Judges, the BIA, and the circuit courts must make
individualized assessments of each asylum-seeker in determining whether
the well-founded fear of future persecution has indeed been rebutted to the
required extent. To achieve this result, I propose that courts look to the
entirety of State Department reports and attempt to find a one-to-one
match between the alleged changes and the evidence of past persecution
submitted by the asylum-seeker. Furthermore, the DHS can make use of
cross-examination of the asylum-seekers to ensure that only bona fide
cases of persecution get the privilege of receiving asylum in the United
States of America.
While the scope of this Note was narrowly focused on the current asy-
lum system's failings concerning Kosovar asylum-seekers, the points made
here have a much broader application. It is true that Kosovo presents a
special situation because many of the Kosovar asylum-seekers complain of
two independent sources of persecution. However, the need for a fairer
asylum system that curbs the asylum tribunals' improper deference to State
Department reports applies just as strongly to all asylum-seekers that face
dire consequences if they are forced to return to their countries. A more
individualized assessment of changed country conditions would improve
the current United States asylum system for all refugees by providing them
with the ability to more fairly present their cases for asylum protection.

